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ABSTRACT
Demographic information and retrospective measures of verdict voting 
preferences were collected from jurors and defendants in 358 state court criminal trials in 
the United States. These actual trial data were used to investigate the priming-leniency 
hypothesis (Foley and Pigott, 2002), as well as effects in isolation from and in 
conjunction with possible similarity-leniency and “black sheep” effects (e.g., Kerr, 
Hymes, Anderson and Weathers, 1995) during the jury deliberation period. Foreperson- 
defendant and juror-defendant same-race pairs elicited no priming- or similarity-leniency 
verdict voting behaviors from their respective jurors, although increased juror verdict 
punitiveness was noted for White pairs in both of these analyses. Furthermore, these 
punitive effects were cumulative. Alternative explanations for and implications of these 
results are discussed.
RACIAL INTERACTIONS:
A DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE ON JUROR BIASES IN DELIBERATIONS
2Introduction
The jury deliberation period has been empirically demonstrated as a critical phase 
in the juror decision-making process. Almost 40% of surveyed jurors from 172 civil trials 
reported a change in their verdict voting preferences during deliberations, over two times 
as many as the second most influential phase of the trial, the plaintiffs evidentiary phase 
(Hannaford, Hans, Mott, and Munsterman, 2000). Nearly 50% of these juror respondents 
indicated that they had made up their minds only in deliberations, dwarfing the level of 
decision-making occurring in other trial phases by nearly 35%. The deliberation period 
remains an understudied phenomenon, however, primarily because of the legal barriers 
preventing naturalistic observation and, of course, experimentation. Researchers have 
instead relied heavily on simulation studies, shadow juries, and post-trial questionnaire 
and interview accounts from former jurors to reveal the decision-making mechanisms 
involved. Inadequacies in both of these methods inhibit full comprehension of 
deliberation proceedings.
Simulated juries, when properly designed, can provide valuable insight that might 
otherwise be unobtainable. However, certain methodological shortcomings commonly 
influence results, rendering skewed versions of what might realistically be expected to 
occur over the course o f actual jury trials and deliberations. Although several flaws 
inherent in simulated jury studies have been identified (e.g., Bomstein, 1999; Diamond, 
1997; Hans, 1992; Loh, 1981), one of the most frequently cited criticisms is that of 
inadequate sampling. The usage of student populations injury simulation research has 
received a great deal o f scrutiny. Non-student samples are generally older and 
demographically more heterogeneous than student populations (Bomstein, 1999). College
3students also tend to be more susceptible to conformity pressures, but more capable of 
handling complex cognitive tasks than the average member of the jury-eligible adult 
population (Sears, 1986). Futhermore, expert testimony holds a stronger influence over 
student populations than the general adult population (Nietzel, McCarthy and Kern,
1999).
Verdict differences between the student and jury populations appear to be less 
evident. Most studies on these verdict differences that produce significant findings are 
contradicted by other studies presenting opposing findings, although certain consistencies 
have emerged. Specifically, student juries do seem to consistently produce more lenient 
verdicts in criminal trials and higher awards in civil trials (Bomstein, 1999). Bomstein’s 
(1999) analysis, however, emphasized differences between student and jury-eligible, non­
student simulation study samples. Non-student simulation participants may yet differ 
from individuals who are actually selected as jurors. For example, voir dire studies on 
juror demographic characteristics have revealed that the juror selection process is biased 
against those of lower socioeconomic status, the uneducated and highly educated, the 
young, racial minorities, and women (Alker, Hosticka and Mitchell, 1976). Real juries 
have been found to be more likely to acquit than simulation juries composed of excused 
jurors or juries composed of a random sample of jury-eligible individuals (Diamond and 
Zeisel, 1974).
Post-trial interviews and surveys are not exempt from sampling biases. These 
methods of analysis require voluntary participation from former jurors, and the volunteer 
ex-juror population may differ substantially from the overall picture of selected jurors 
(Diamond, 1997). The ability to draw inferences from such studies is further complicated
4by the empirically demonstrated inaccuracy of jurors in recalling events and 
retrospectively judging influences on their behavior (Hans, 1992). Any of a variety of 
hindsight biases may especially interfere with the recollection of trends in verdict opinion 
formation and other primarily subjective data.
Despite certain validity concerns and criticisms, previous jury research has 
managed to elucidate several aspects of jury decision-making in general. While juror 
decision-making is predominantly influenced by evidentiary issues (e.g., Greene, Chopra, 
Kovera, Penrod, Rose, Schuller, et al., 2002; Kalven and Zeisel, 1966; Visher, 1987), 
curious investigators have plodded on in their search for factors underlying remaining 
differences in individual verdict voting preferences. Although some research appears to 
indicate that certain inherent demographic factors may bias juror verdict preferences, 
scientific persistence in the face of a long history of inconsistent results has attracted a 
great deal of criticism regarding the legitimacy of this line of research. Initially, 
investigations focused on juror or defendant demographic variables in isolation, revealing 
few (and often inconsistent) main predictors of juror verdict preferences (Devine,
Clayton, Dunford, Seying and Pryce, 2001; Howard and Redfering, 1983). A more 
fruitful—albeit less thoroughly explored—direction of demographically focused jury 
decision-making research, however, examines the interactive effects of these 
characteristics. Adler (1973) revealed a socioeconomic bias in juror decision-making, 
such that cases with large discrepancies in occupational status between jurors and 
defendants were characterized by high conviction rates. Juror sex differences also seemed 
to emerge as a factor influencing juror verdict votes as well, but only under specific 
circumstances. For example, studies with cases involving sexual crimes against women
5and children appeared to influence greater conviction-prone tendencies in female jurors 
(Greene et al., 2002).
Other research focusing on demographic interactions between jurors and 
defendants has identified evidence for apparently robust juror decision-making biases. 
Particularly, a liking-leniency bias, wherein “factors that increase a juror’s liking for a 
defendant will also prompt more lenient juror treatment of that defendant” (Niedermeier, 
Horowitz and Kerr, 2001, p. 604), has been replicated at length using a variety of 
measures. For example, defendant physical attractiveness has generally been found to 
increase leniency, although case-specific details regarding the use of attractiveness for 
deceptive purposes may induce harsher verdicts (Kapardis, 2003). An overlapping subset 
of mock-jury studies in this area supports the notion of a similarity-leniency bias. That is, 
similarity has been found to have a direct positive effect on attraction (e.g., Byrne, Clore, 
and Smeaton, 1996), which, through liking-leniency effects (e.g., Davis, Bray and Holt, 
1977), induces more favorable verdict votes from jurors. Other research has adopted the 
similarity-leniency hypothesis from a Social Identity Theory (SIT) perspective, claiming 
that people categorize others as belonging to their in-group or out-group and are 
motivated to maintain a positive self-image by behaving more favorably towards in­
group members and/or more punitively against out-group members (e.g., Tajfel and 
Turner, 1986; Taylor and Hosch, 2004). Adopting either or both of these theories, several 
studies have supported the similarity-leniency effect. While several variables can be 
incorporated into the “similar-different” framework—including political ideology 
(Amato, 1981) and religion (Kerr, Hymes, Anderson and Weathers, 1995)—the majority 
of contributing literature has focused on racial similarity. Constantini and King (1981),
6for instance, conducted a telephonic public opinion survey regarding a highly publicized 
homicide case against a defendant of Hispanic descent. An “exceptionally large” 
proportion of respondents with an ethnic background similar to that of the defendant were 
significantly less likely to believe in the defendant’s guilt and, subsequently, were also 
more likely to believe that they would be unable to serve as an impartial juror in his trial. 
Sommers and Ellsworth (2000) conducted a mock jury study that examined White and 
Black mock juror verdict preferences in interracial trials. When participants were 
subjected to conditions in which race was made salient, same-race leniency effects were 
detected for both Black jurors and defendants and for White jurors and defendants. 
Positive in-group biases and negative out-group biases have been identified in mock jury 
studies for White (Foley and Chamblin, 1982) and both White and Black juror-defendant 
pairs (Ugwuegbu, 1979).
Inquiries into the pervasiveness of the similarity-leniency bias amongst all races, 
however, have not always returned supportive results. Abwender and Hough (2001) 
found that Black participants demonstrated a same-race leniency bias, whereas White 
participants demonstrated no significant race-based difference in verdict voting. Perez, 
Hosch, Ponder and Trejo’s (1993) mock jury study of 480 participants, however, revealed 
a race-based similarity-leniency effect for Whites, but not for Hispanics. Other studies 
have countered the similarity-leniency hypothesis entirely with case-specific instances of 
a reverse effect. A documented “black sheep” effect (BSE) has demonstrated that 
similarity between jurors and defendants may also result in harsher verdicts (e.g., 
Marques, Robalo and Rocha, 1992). Specifically, in the Kerr et al. (1995) analysis of 
student mock jurors, the strength of evidence determined whether a similarity-leniency
7bias or BSE would occur. In trials with weak, ambiguous prosecution evidence, the 
similarity-leniency bias would be upheld. In cases with strong, unambiguous prosecution 
evidence, the BSE would come into play. Chadee’s (1996) mock jury analysis of 720 
potential jurors in Trinidad detected a similar pattern for Black and White participants 
exposed to a recorded murder trial of a Black defendant. When evidence was ambiguous, 
Black participants were more lenient than the White participants. When evidence was 
unambiguous regarding the Black defendant’s guilt, however, a reverse trend was 
detected: Black participants’ verdicts were harsher than those of White participants. As 
Chadee’s results clearly articulate, racial interaction biases detected in American juries 
are also replicated in and have implications for juries of other “new world” democratic 
nations.
A recent study examined similarity-leniency (in-group leniency), out-group 
punitiveness, and the black sheep hypotheses simultaneously to determine the role of 
such biases in determining verdicts, above and beyond the strength of evidence. This 
large-scale analysis by Taylor and Hosch (2004), using archival data collected from 
actual juries in two Texas counties between 1987 and 1989, served to argue against such 
racial interaction effects entirely. In their study, the authors hypothesized that similarity- 
leniency would be evident in cases in which the defendant was of the same ethnic group 
as the jury numerical majority. Out-group punitiveness was functionally defined as a 
trend towards harsher verdicts for defendants who were of a different ethnic group than 
their jury’s numerical majority. The BSE analysis focused on cases with strong evidence 
against the defendant, in which the same-race juror was a numerical minority in a jury 
that was composed of an extreme majority (almost entirely homogeneous). No significant
results for any of the hypotheses were found. However, the unclear and potentially 
problematic methodology for this analysis prevents its interpretation as credible 
counterevidence for psychological phenomena that have been so robustly demonstrated in 
preceding studies. Although this examination focuses on racial comparisons between 
jurors and defendants, the archival data set used in this study apparently did not originally 
include the race of each juror. Instead, authors manually coded race based solely on the 
ethnicity of jurors’ surnames. Furthermore, race was parsed into two categories: 
“Hispanic” and the artificial “Non-Hispanic,” which the reader may presume to include 
White, Black, Asian, Native American, and a variety of other defendant ethnicities. The 
degree to which the combination of surname identification errors and the pooled “Non- 
Hispanic” racial category may have affected results is unclear. Furthermore, the 
functional definitions of the three biases under examination may not have been wholly 
accurate. Numerical minority jurors may also be affected by such biases; the juror need 
not be in the racial numerical majority for these effects to occur. These effects have been 
consistently demonstrated at the individual juror level, and the missing link in this 
particular evaluation may be a number of convoluting factors, including salience of racial 
issues, which has previously been identified as an important contributing factor for racial 
interaction effects (Sommers and Ellsworth, 2003; Sommers and Ellsworth, 2001; 
Sommers and Ellsworth, 2000).
Foley and Pigott (2002) recognized the importance of racial salience, perhaps as 
the parent factor that determines the applicability of similarity-leniency, out-group 
punitiveness, or black sheep effects. Instead of examining the racial interaction between 
defendants and jurors, the racial relationship between the defendant and the jury
9foreperson—who has significantly more influence over jurors than any other, non­
presiding juror (Foley and Pigott, 1997)—served as the primary manipulation. The 
authors proposed that a foreperson of a racial minority would make ethnicity salient to a 
juror, who would then evaluate a defendant of the same racial minority more leniently. 
However, this leniency shift would not occur in cases when the foreperson was white, as 
this is presumably a typical scenario that does not prompt racial salience. The authors 
suggest that this verdict voting discrepancy would occur in the context of current social 
attitudes about racial prejudice. Specifically, individuals in contemporary society are 
motivated by social desirability to appear non-prejudiced, which would counteract and 
overwhelm any subconscious negative stereotype activation (Biemat and Vescio, 2002; 
Monteith, Deneen and Tooman, 1996).
Foley and Pigott’s (2002) analysis attempted to isolate the foreperson’s race- 
priming contribution from other potentially biasing effects prior to deliberations. Using a 
participant pool split between college students and jury-eligible citizens, their study 
found no differences in juror or foreperson verdict preference prior to deliberations. Only 
after deliberations commenced and the mock jury selected its foreperson, however, did 
reverse discrimination in jury verdict emerge. Black foreperson juries attributed 
significantly less responsibility to the Black defendant, but no difference was detected 
when the defendant was White. No global similarity-leniency effects between jurors and 
defendants were found.
Although decision-making research on the deliberation phase has been scarce, 
several other studies have also specifically honed in on this trial phase. Rumsey (1979) 
suggested that juror opinion shifts during the deliberation phase increased leniency for
10
the defendant, based on his investigation of demographic manipulations on remorse in 96 
male and female student subjects. Other research has provided supporting evidence for 
such a leniency shift in deliberations using additional student and community volunteer 
samples (MacCoun and Kerr, 1988; Kerr, MacCoun and Kramer, 1996). Therefore, 
despite the strong relationships that evidentiary issues and initial jury majority verdict 
voting preferences have with a jury’s ultimate verdict (Devine et al., 2001; Tanford and 
Penrod, 1986), the deliberation phase still reliably alters individual verdict voting 
preferences, and more lenient attributions of defendant culpability has been one 
consistently identified byproduct.
The present study extends Foley and Pigott’s (2002) deliberation phase analysis 
of the priming-leniency hypothesis. One of the concerns regarding previous work on 
racial interaction effects is that research has been almost exclusively conducted using 
mock juries, without real-jury comparisons to verify the validity of these findings.
Despite the potentially confounding methodological inadequacies and outdated sample 
pool in Taylor and Hosch (2004), their results suggest that several racial biases detected 
in simulation studies may simply be laboratory artifacts without real-world consequences. 
To address this issue, the current study incorporated data from hundreds of actual felony 
criminal trials from four major court sites across the United States, collected between the 
years 2000 and 2001. Furthermore, to illustrate the importance of deliberations in this 
particular sample, the frequency of opinion change over each of the key phases of the 
trial will be analyzed.
In addition, Hans (1992) has argued that contemporary juries are far more 
diversified and representative of the general public than they have been in the past. For
11
example, Klein and Klastorin (1999) demonstrated a relationship between jury racial 
diversity and hung jury rates, but only for cases in which the defendant was black. With 
such a dramatic implication already detected, it is reasonable to suspect that foreperson 
statistics have likely become less polarized by such diversity as well. The average 
foreperson may no longer be predominantly white (e.g., Boster, Hunter and Hale, 1991), 
male (e.g., Beckham and Aronson, 1978; Mills and Bohannon, 1981), higher status (e.g., 
Strodtbeck, James and Hawkins, 1957; Strodtbeck and Lipinski, 1985), or with more 
previous jury experience (e.g., Dillehay and Nietzel, 1985) than the average juror. With 
this in mind, an updated characterization of juror and foreperson demographic 
characteristics may be in order. Thus, the second step of the present study is an 
exploratory analysis of the current status of these features.
To determine whether Foley and Pigott’s (2002) findings extend to actual state
\
court felony trials, the present study replicates the original investigation, but expands the 
racial groupings to include Hispanics as well. Same-race foreperson and defendant trials 
will be examined as predictors of final juror votes. Again, pre-deliberation verdict votes 
of jurors will be included to control for any pre-existing biases or judgments, such as 
evidentiary issues and “initial-impression” contributions from similarity-leniency and 
black sheep effects that may color a juror’s perception of such evidence. By adding pre­
deliberation verdict preferences to the analysis, we can ensure that only the consequences 
induced by deliberations will be investigated. If Foley and Pigott’s (2002) priming- 
leniency hypothesis is generalizable to actual trial scenarios, Black and Hispanic 
defendants will be treated more leniently by juries with Black and Hispanic foremen, 
respectively.
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Similarity-leniency or black-sheep effects over the course of deliberations will 
also be examined. Aside from Foley and Pigott (2002), previous studies have not 
analyzed the role of such biases in deliberations alone. Foley and Pigott (2002) revealed 
no such biases in their simulation study, but a real-jury examination may yield different 
results. Although the nature of such biases suggest that much of their influence likely 
occurs over the perception of and perspective on trial evidence and argument—before the 
deliberation period—some effects may extend into deliberations. As black sheep effects 
are established as an attempt to distance oneself from a negatively perceived similar other 
in cases of severe prosecution evidence, it seems possible that same-race jurors in such 
scenarios would exhibit this bias most strongly in the deliberation period, after exposure 
to strong evidence presented in the trial and when they are most likely to feel the pressure 
of social comparison. Although previous studies have cited a leniency shift during the 
deliberation period, it may be more likely that similarity-leniency is attenuated in same- 
race jurors over the course of deliberations, akin to a sort of “regression to the mean” 
effect. Thus, as a caveat to research indicating a leniency shift in deliberations, both a 
diminished similarity-leniency effect and a stronger black sheep effect should be noted 
during the deliberation phase.
Should the previous hypothesis yield any significant results, another crucial 
assessment would examine priming-leniency effects in absence of similarity-leniency 
effects. That is, the motivation to be perceived as “unprejudiced” may be relevant only to 
White jurors, as Foley and Pigott (2002) claim, but differential priming-leniency effects 
may also occur for jurors o f any race. In order to isolate and detect such priming-leniency 
effects, similarity-leniency and “black sheep” effects in their entirety must be eliminated.
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Therefore, the same-race foreperson-defendant analysis will be conducted solely for 
jurors of a non-similar ethnicity, extracting effects based on juror and defendant racial 
similarity.
Finally, this study will attempt to address the question of how similarity-leniency, 
black sheep, and priming-leniency effects interact. Of the possible outcomes, priming- 
leniency may be negated by similarity-leniency effects, or vice-versa. Even still, their 
effects may be supplementary. For jurors in whom the black sheep effect is influencing 
verdict voting behavior, any priming-leniency bias may be rendered irrelevant. It may 
also be possible that these two biases serve to counteract each other. Furthermore, one of 
these racial interaction biases may prove to be more influential than the rest, 
overwhelming any other effects. This study will conclude by examining the additive 
nature of previously identified racial interaction biases in the defendant, the foreperson, 
and the juror himself.
Method
Archival data from Hannaford-Agor, Hans, Mott, and Munsterman’s (2002) “Are 
Hung Juries A Problem?” study was obtained for the statistical analyses in the current 
investigation. As a part of the original Hannaford-Agor et al. (2002) study, the National 
Center for State Courts, a court research and development institute in Williamsburg, 
Virginia, issued several questionnaire packets to judges o f non-capital felony jury trials 
from four jurisdictions: the Los Angeles County Superior Court in California, Maricopa 
County Superior Court in Arizona, Bronx County Supreme Court in New York, and the 
District of Columbia Superior Court in Washington, DC. These packets contained 
surveys to be completed by attorneys, judges, and individual jurors, and also included
14
case data forms that were typically completed by court staff. The participating court 
sites, selected for their high case volume, court personnel cooperative in data collection, 
and institutional characteristics such as hung jury rate concerns, high caseload, or newly 
implemented procedural innovations, were independently responsible for the distribution 
and collection of surveys.
A pretest of survey packet materials and data collection procedures was 
conducted in Los Angeles in 1999. Of fifty distributed packets, 18 were completed and 
returned. The results of this pretest were evaluated by the project’s Advisory Committee, 
which submitted recommendations for its revision that primarily focused on improving 
measurements o f hung jury rates and altering the juror survey to eliminate questions that 
might provide grounds for appeal by the defendant.
Following this pretest and revision of data collection procedures, the four test 
sites issued questionnaire packets to the appropriate courtrooms at varying periods 
between June 2000 and October 2001. The questionnaire packets themselves contained 
instructions, individualized questionnaires (for the judge, attorneys, and jurors), and a 
case data form. Court personnel distributed the packet questionnaires to judges, jurors, 
and attorneys for all cases that continued through jury deliberations. Participation in the 
completion and return of the questionnaires was entirely voluntary and anonymous. The 
packet components were completed in the following sequence: the case data form 
(Appendix A) completed by the judge or clerk during jury selection and actual trial; Part I 
of judge and attorney questionnaires completed during jury deliberations; and Part II of 
judge and attorney questionnaires, as well as juror questionnaires in their entirety 
(Appendix B), completed following the announcement of verdict and during release of
15
jurors. A chronological timeline depicting this sequence is charted in the methodology of 
the original study (Hannaford-Agor et al., 2002). Reported response rates for returned 
questionnaires were 91% forjudges, 69% for defense attorneys, 72% for prosecuting 
attorneys, and 80% for jurors. For more information regarding methodological concerns 
in data collection, see “Chapter Three -  Project Methodology” (pp. 29-40) in Hannaford- 
Agor et al. (2002).
For the present study, information extracted from the questionnaires and forms 
included:
• Case Data Form -  defendant race/ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic).
• Juror Questionnaires -  Juror formation of opinion over the course of the 
trial and jury deliberations, predeliberation verdict voting preference, and 
religiosity were measured using 7-point Likert scales. Juror final verdict 
vote and demographic information, such as sex, age (18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 
46-55, 56-65, over 65), race/ethnicity (Black, White, Hispanic, Native 
American, Asian, Other), education level (Less than four years of high 
school, High school graduate, Some college, College graduate, Post­
graduate work), income (Under $10, 000, Between $10,000 and $19,999, 
Between $20,000 and $29,999, Between $30,000 and $39,999, Between 
$40,000 and $49,999, Between $50,000 and $75,000, Over $75,000), 
occupation (Managerial specialties, Professional, Technical/Sales, Service, 
Agricultural, Mechanic/Craftsman, Operator/Laboror/Transportation 
worker, Other), previous jury experience, and foreperson status employed 
nominal scales.
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Ethnicity, sex, household income, education, age, occupational category, 
religiosity, and whether or not the respondent had previous experience as a juror were 
examined in the comparative demographic evaluation between jurors and foremen. Juror, 
foreperson, and defendant race and sex were contrasted to determine the predictive value 
of demographic interaction effects in juror verdict voting preferences. Juror verdict votes 
were evaluated on a 7-point Likert scale with “1” strongly favoring the prosecution and 
“7” strongly favoring the defense. That is, the lowest score reflected a juror’s voting 
preference that strongly favored a guilty verdict for the defendant, whereas the highest 
score reflected a strong not-guilty verdict preference. Jurors were asked to retrospectively 
rate individual voting preferences after the actual criminal trial itself, but prior to jury 
deliberations (the “pre-deliberation verdict vote preference”). The jurors were also asked 
to indicate whether or not they had changed their culpability opinions over various phases 
of the trial and jury deliberations. Responses from 3314 jurors and 308 defendants in 
trials at four state court sites were included in the analyses.
Results
Initial Analyses
Opinion formation. Out of 3314 juror questionnaire respondents, 2603 voluntarily 
reported information on their opinion formation processes. Of these jurors, 31% indicated 
that they never changed their minds about the direction of their verdict votes over the 
course of the trial. The most influential segment of the trial appears to be jury 
deliberations, as 23.6% of all juror respondents reported a change in the directionality of 
their verdict vote preferences during this trial phase. The testimony of the state, or the 
prosecution, swayed 18.4%, and each of the five remaining trial segments (opening
17
statements by the prosecution and defense, testimony of the defense, and closing 
arguments of the prosecution and defense) influenced a verdict voting preference shift for 
an average of only 7% of jurors.
Juror and foreperson demographic frequencies. Demographic frequencies for all 
non-presiding juror respondents revealed that they were most often white (45.8%), 
female (57.4%), religious (64.8%), middle-aged professionals (39.5%) between the ages 
36 to 45 (25.1%), with an annual household income greater than $75,000 (30.9%). Non­
presiding jurors were also more likely to have previously served as a juror than not 
(52.8%) and to have some college education or an undergraduate degree (59.4%). 
Foreperson respondents were most often white (38%), female (53.3%), and religious 
(70%), with managerial occupations (25.5%) and a household income greater than 
$75,000 per year (25.9%). Most frequently between the ages of 26 and 35 (28.1%), these 
participants were also more likely to have previous jury experience (59.3%) and some 
college education or an undergraduate degree (54.8%).
Correlational analyses. Forepersons tended to have more previous jury 
experience than the average juror, as depicted in Table 1. Interestingly, household income 
and religion were both negatively correlated with foreperson status (r = -.067,/? < .001 
and r = -.040,/? < .05, respectively). Racial differences revealed a significant positive 
relationship between Black jurors and foreman status (r = .068,/? < .001), but a 
significant negative relationship for White jurors (r = -.060,/? = .001). In other words, 
Black jurors were elected as foreperson significantly more frequently, and White jurors 
less frequently, than would be expected by chance. Furthermore, whereas jurors with 
managerial occupations were significantly more likely to be associated with foremanship
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(r = .045,/? < .05), professional or technical/sales occupational categories were less likely 
(r = -.045,/? < .05 and r -  -.040,/? < .05, respectively).
Hierarchical Linear Regression Analyses
White, Black, and Hispanic racial groups were included in the following analyses. 
Inadequate sampling sizes prevented the inclusion of other racial categories, such as 
Native American or Asian, in the following investigations. As replicating Foley and 
Pigott’s (2002) ANOVA design became impossible with the inclusion of a third racial 
category, the remaining four hypotheses were analyzed using dummy coded racial 
variables in a hierarchical linear regression model. Predeliberation verdict voting 
preference was included as a first-level independent variable for all multiple regression 
analyses, effectively eliminating variance in verdict voting opinion formation existing 
prior to deliberations.
Priming-leniency. Overall racial similarity between the foreperson and defendant 
did not significantly influence the juror’s final vote in deliberations (J3 = -.046). No 
priming-leniency effects emerged for any of the three racial groups, as depicted in Table
2. However, a significant negative relationship did emerge for cases in which the 
foreperson and defendant were both white (J3 = -.102,/? = .001). This accounted for 1% of 
the variance in final verdict voting (AR2= .010).
Similarity-leniency and “black sheep. ” Racial similarity between the juror and 
defendant also did not significantly influence the juror’s verdict vote during deliberations 
(fi= -.013). Furthermore, no similarity-leniency effects for any racial groups were 
detected over the course of deliberations (Table 3). Instead, analyses revealed a “black
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sheep” effect for whites only (J3 = -.081,/> < .01). This accounted for 0.7% of the 
variance in final verdict voting (AR2= .007).
Priming-leniency independent o f similarity-leniency and “black sheep. ’’ 
Eliminating juror-defendant pairs with the same race, only jurors with racial 
discrepancies with the defendant were reexamined for foreperson-induced priming- 
leniency effects in deliberations. Again, racial similarity between the foreperson and the 
defendant did not significantly predict the juror’s verdict vote (ft = -.037). The priming- 
leniency hypothesis was also not statistically supported for any of the three foreperson- 
defendant race pairings (Table 4). These analyses did, however, reproduce the findings 
from the first regression analysis on priming effects, revealing that members of juries 
with a white foreperson and for a white defendant had significantly harsher final verdict 
votes than for all other foreperson-defendant racial combinations (J3 = -.102, p  < .01).
This accounted for 1.0% of the variance in final verdict voting (AR2 = .010).
Additive effects. In examining the possible additive effects o f similarity (the juror 
and defendant share the same race) and priming (the foreman and defendant share the 
same race) on juror final verdict votes, the trend against white defendants continued. As 
the number of white players involved in the equation increased, the juror became 
increasingly inclined to submit a final verdict vote of “guilty” (J3 = -.098, p  < .01). This 
accounted for 0.9% of the variance in final verdict voting (AR2 = .009). No verdict voting 
biases were detected for any other racial combination.
Post hoc analysis. Two post hoc hierarchical linear regression analyses were 
conducted (a) to determine if  priming-leniency actually occurred with racial minority 
jurors, or these jurors ubiquitously voted more punitively for a White defendant; and (b)
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to eliminate the possible explanation that White jurors were more punitive during 
deliberations than jurors with other ethnic backgrounds. Examining only racial minority 
juror (Hispanic or Black) verdict vote preferences, a new variable was added to the 
original priming-leniency analysis: White defendants and a non-White (racial minority) 
foreperson. By investigating racial minority juror verdict vote preferences in cases where 
no “priming” White foreperson was available, racial minority verdict preferences for 
White defendants could be more accurately determined. For these racial minorities, 
priming again appeared to affect verdict vote preferences (Table 6), as racial minority 
jurors involved in cases against a White defendant in which the foreperson was White 
presented significantly harsher verdict vote preferences after deliberations than racial 
minority jurors injuries with other racial dynamics (ft = -.137,/? < .01). Furthermore, 
such a difference did not emerge for cases without a White foreperson (fi = .014).
For the second post hoc hierarchical linear regression, the similarity-leniency and 
“black sheep” analysis was conducted with the inclusion of a fourth independent variable 
identifying White juror and racial minority defendant pairs. By investigating these cases 
individually, the verdict voting behaviors of White jurors during deliberations could be 
more accurately determined as either following a BSE trend or a trend that encompassed 
both a BSE and an outgroup punitiveness trend simultaneously (e.g., a more punitive 
overall trend). White defendants elicited significantly harsher verdict votes from White 
jurors than defendants in cases with other racial combinations (J3 = -.093, p  < .01). White 
jurors did not, however, present any such significant trend in cases with a racial minority 
defendant (/? = -.033), suggesting that racial similarity was a key influence on the verdict 
voting behavior of White jurors.
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Discussion
The main goals of present study were to supplement Foley and Pigott’s (2002) 
simulation study findings with a real-jury replication, while expanding research to 
examine relations between known racial interaction biases during the deliberation phase. 
The jury deliberation period, as evidenced in previous empirical research, contributes 
significantly to the ultimate trial outcome. The preliminary frequency analysis on opinion 
formation indicates that, in this particular sample of 358 state court criminal trials, 
deliberations also produced the most juror verdict opinion change of any trial segment, 
including evidentiary phases.
Preliminary analyses. The demographic frequency analysis o f presiding and non­
presiding jurors revealed that the jury foreperson may no longer be the stereotypical high- 
status male summarized by Hastie, Penrod and Pennington (1983). Although sex 
differences were not affiliated with foreperson status, this sample contained more female 
than male presiding jurors. The correlational analysis revealed a few more contradictions 
with the previously existing foreperson stereotype. Household income, White race and 
professional occupation in jurors were negatively correlated with foremanship. That is, 
White, higher-income, and/or professionally employed jurors were elected as foreperson 
during deliberations less than would be expected by chance. Surprisingly, self-reported 
religiousness was also a significantly negatively correlated variable. This cannot be 
explained away through higher levels of education, as educational history was not 
significantly correlated with foreperson status. Finally, Black jurors and jurors with 
managerial occupations were more likely than chance to be elected as foreperson. Hans’s 
(1992) argument of increased jury diversification seems to also extend to foreperson
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status, as juries appear to be electing a more diverse array of individuals into the 
foreperson position.
Substantive main analyses. In an extension of Foley and Pigott’s (2002) simulated 
study, an analysis of White, Black, and Hispanic foreperson-defendant pairs revealed no 
priming-leniency bias in juror verdict voting preferences. Contrary to the original study, 
however, a negative relationship was detected for White defendant and foreperson pairs. 
This suggests that juror verdict votes were significantly more punitive for White 
defendants when a White foreperson presided over the jury than for trials with other 
racial dynamics. Since most jurors in the sample were White, however, this finding may 
be an artifact of existing juror-defendant racial similarity biases. A second analysis 
examining juror-defendant racial similarity effects indeed revealed a punitive trend over 
the course of deliberations between White jurors and White defendants only. This “black 
sheep” effect could possibly have explained the White priming results of the previous 
analysis. Therefore, all same-race juror-defendant pairs were removed from the 
foreperson-defendant priming analysis, eliminating all confounding individual-level 
“black sheep” effects. Interestingly, the third analysis revealed a persisting White 
priming-punitiveness trend. Apparently, not only were White juror final verdict votes 
significantly more punitive during deliberations in trials for White defendants than for 
jurors experiencing other racial dynamics, but ethnic minority juror verdict preferences 
were also significantly influenced by out-group punitiveness that exclusively targeted 
Whites when a White foreperson was elected.
This study also attempted to ascertain the nature of the negative White priming 
bias and the black sheep effect when combined. An exploratory regression analysis
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revealed that these racial interaction biases were additive. With more white key players, 
juror final verdict votes were increasingly punitive compared to verdict votes produced 
out of other racial combinations. That is, White jurors (a) serving on juries presided over 
by a White foreperson and (b) serving in trials for White defendants were most likely to 
issue a strong guilty verdict; cases in which the juror, foreperson, and defendant were not 
White were least likely to elicit strong guilty verdicts.
Post hoc analyses. After conducting the original analyses, it became evident that 
two major possible explanations prevented a clearer understanding of these results. One 
possible alternative account could have been that priming is irrelevant for this verdict 
trend to emerge because White defendants could simply receive more overall guilty 
verdicts. A post hoc multiple regression analysis examined this question by investigating 
racial minority juror verdict voting behavior in trials with the same-race foreperson- 
defendant pairs used in the previous priming analyses. However, the post hoc regression 
also included a new variable representing racial minority foreperson and White defendant 
pairs. This analysis failed to reveal a significant effect between racial minority jurors and 
White defendants in absence of a White foreperson (J3 = .014). These results, coupled 
with the previous finding that the BSE and priming effects are additive, reveal that a 
selective priming effect, induced by a same-race foreperson, occurs in cases with White 
defendants that engenders punitive verdict voting behavior from all jurors. This post hoc 
analysis reveals that the priming component o f the equation is crucial for the emergence 
of the bias. Such verdicts are only significantly more punitive than trials with other racial 
dynamics if both the foreperson and the defendant are White.
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A second post hoc multiple regression analysis attempted to resolve another 
possible partial alternative explanation for these results. White jurors were the only racial 
subtype that appeared to be susceptible to any racial similarity bias during deliberations, 
though it remained possible that White jurors were simply more likely to present a 
punitive verdict voting trend over the course of deliberations. To address this issue, juror 
and defendant racial similarity pairs were again analyzed, with the inclusion of a White 
juror and racial minority defendant pair variable. Because White jurors did not exhibit a 
punitive bias towards racial minority defendants as they did with White defendants, these 
results indicated that the deliberation verdict voting behavior of White jurors was not 
universally punitive, but rather was directed at same-race defendants. Thus, White juror 
verdict voting behavior during deliberations can be accurately described as conforming to 
the BSE.
Summary and theoretical explanation o f results. We can reasonably conclude that 
all racial groupings may be susceptible to a punitive verdict voting trend against White 
defendants during deliberations. For White jurors, a punitive verdict voting bias (a “black 
sheep” effect) was evident regardless of foreperson race. Thus, the second hypothesis— 
that a BSE, not a similarity-leniency effect, would be evident in deliberations—was 
partially supported. Results suggest that this punitive White juror verdict voting bias was 
enhanced when the foreperson was also White. For ethnic minority jurors, significantly 
more punitive verdict votes were detected against White defendants only when the 
foreperson was also White. This cannot be accounted for by the racial minority -  racial 
majority out-group punitiveness explanation alone, as the White foreperson was
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necessary to elicit the bias. No racially related verdict voting trends were detected over 
the course of deliberations in trials for racial minority defendants.
Evidently, this negative White priming bias is a novel phenomenon. Priming- 
leniency, similarity-leniency, “black sheep,” and out-group punitiveness hypotheses 
cannot fully explain the trends that have been identified in this study. Interestingly, jurors 
of all racial subtypes appear to be affected by this deliberation period bias in the same 
manner. When a White foreperson is elected during deliberations, s/he creates a racially 
salient atmosphere that induces a behavioral trend in each juror’s verdict voting that 
reflects a more punitive evaluation of the White defendant than cases with any other 
racial dynamic. A reasonable reinterpretation of this study could rephrase the results to 
state that cases with other racial combinations resulted in more lenient verdicts than cases 
with a White juror and defendant or a White foreperson and defendant. That is, juror- 
foreperson racial combinations in trials for non-White defendants would result in more 
not-guilty verdicts. O f course, this is still not evident in any same-race Black or Hispanic 
pair in isolation, and White jurors were not more punitive towards racial minority jurors 
overall. Ultimately, this explanation is far too selective, making a logical justification far 
too difficult, to be a rational line of reasoning. Additive White punitive-priming and 
“black sheep” effect explanations are the most parsimonious accounts of the results of 
this study.
Several theories may explain the punitive verdict voting trends against White 
defendants. First, Foley and Pigott’s (2002) main argument, that White jurors are 
motivated to appear unprejudiced, may still have merit. These authors proposed and 
supported their hypothesis that minority defendants are treated more leniently when
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White jurors are racially primed by minority forepersons in their simulated jury study. 
Instead, the present evaluation of actual state court felony trial deliberations in several 
major jurisdictions in the United States of America revealed that jurors react more 
punitively towards White defendants when the foreperson was also White, and White 
jurors exhibited a BSE in their verdict voting behaviors. Using Foley and Pigott’s (2002) 
rationale for the present results, White jurors may, in actuality, become more sensitive to 
the racist implications of leniency between members of the “White majority” as the 
number of key White individuals increase and as the number of key ethnic minority 
individuals decrease. A more punitive verdict voting trend here may reflect White jurors’ 
recognition of negative historical stereotypes and desire to avoid being perceived as 
fulfilling such a stereotype.
Along these same lines, a “regression to the mean” explanation may also have 
merit. Perhaps jurors are inclined to exhibit leniency towards White defendants during 
the trial, influenced by irrepressible, media-induced positive associations with the “White 
majority” (Gladwell, 2005). Discussion with other jurors may serve to attenuate this pre­
existing pro-White bias in White jurors, resulting in a more punitive reevaluation of the 
defendant during the deliberation period.
Alternatively, White jurors may present a punitive deliberation verdict voting 
trend for White defendants out of the classic “black sheep” motivation. When a White 
foreperson is elected, White jurors may subconsciously recognize the contrast not only 
between themselves and the defendant, but also the foreperson and defendant. This 
additional comparison may lend credence to the White juror’s progressively negative 
evaluation of the defendant, bolstered by a potentially BSE-influenced White foreperson
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who may also be voicing a punitive verdict preference. The White priming-punitiveness 
effect in ethnic minority jurors may be caused by a corresponding process: an elected 
White foreperson may subconsciously provide racial minority jurors with a positive 
comparison that contrasts with the defendant, which may again be particularly influential 
if  that foreperson presents a guilty verdict.
An alternative explanation for the punitive verdict voting trends of racial minority 
jurors may parallel the anti-racism motivation suggested by Foley and Pigott (2002). That 
is, the implications of the “White majority” may become more salient to racial minority 
jurors when the elected presiding juror is White. This racial salience may prompt the 
emergence of a case-specific out-group punitiveness effect. That is, when a White juror is 
elected as foreperson, the historical stereotype of the advantaged White individual may 
be primed, resulting in a detectable, punitive verdict voting trend.
Any, all, or none of these explanations could underlie the punitive deliberation 
period verdict voting trends identified against White defendants in this study. As a note 
of caution, however, this study is not to be interpreted as evidence for or against a 
similarity-leniency, black sheep, or out-group punitiveness hypothesis prior to the 
deliberation period. With the exception of the black sheep effect, which requires exposure 
to evidentiary issues to surface, these racial interaction biases would intuitively occur 
prior to deliberations. Because similarity-leniency and out-group punitiveness biases 
operate primarily from a standpoint of racial similarity, these “first impression” effects 
would create the most impact early in the trial and in subsequent interpretation of trial 
evidence. Thus, most of the influence such biases will have over juror final verdicts will 
likely have already taken place prior to deliberations. Indeed, this study demonstrated that
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racial similarity no longer influenced verdict voting trends towards leniency during the 
deliberation period.
Furthermore, racial priming could occur in a variety of other ways not included in 
the present analyses. Aside from foreperson race, as operationalized by Foley and Pigott 
(2002), an outspoken fellow member of the jury could also prompt similar racial 
awareness. Jury composition, judge and/or attorney racial similarity to the defendant, 
case factors, and personal events and experiences are other possible variables that could 
increase racial salience. Foreperson and defendant racial similarity is simply one of many 
methods for capturing this phenomenon and, in light of so many other unmeasured 
factors that could potentially increase racial salience, should be regarded as a rough 
estimate used to demonstrate the effect.
Study limitations and future directions. Admittedly, hindsight biases, as 
previously discussed and as noted in Kapardis (2003), may have been problematic for this 
study. Because post-trial questionnaires rely on retrospective judgment, memory shifts 
and cognitive dissonance may corrupt reported voting preferences. Hans (1992) asserts 
that the existence of hindsight bias suggests that studies based on juror recollections 
alone to understand the jury decision-making process should be interpreted with caution. 
With this in mind, the effects detected in this study should indeed be interpreted 
carefully, as they may not accurately reflect the actual nature of verdict opinion shifts 
during deliberations. Further investigation and replications are necessary before any firm 
conclusions can be made.
Finally, although this study expanded the racial investigation to encompass White, 
Black, and Hispanic ethnicities, more effort should be made to identify and evaluate
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interactions involving other racial minorities. While Native American and Asian ethnic 
categories were originally included in the data collection phase of this study, the lack of 
such cases made the inclusion of such an analysis in the present study impossible and 
tremendously unreliable. However, interaction effects may occur differentially with other 
minority groups, particularly for those with dramatically dissimilar cultural backgrounds. 
For example, the historically collectivistic nature of most Asian populations—and the 
accompanying stereotypical perception of them—may distinctively affect juror 
judgments and verdict behaviors. For this reason, future studies may wish to target 
additional state court jurisdictions that serve diverse communities. Furthermore, a 
comparative analysis between diverse state court jurisdictions and more isolated, 
homogeneous jurisdictions may reveal differential implicit and explicit racial attitudes 
and dynamics.
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TABLE 1
INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN FOREPERSON STATUS AND 
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Demographics Foreperson Status
Sex
(N=  3016)
-.031
Age -.018
Race
Black/African American .068**
White/Caucasian -.060**
Hispanic .031
Education -.027
Previous Jury Experience .049**
Religiousness -.040*
Occupation
Managerial Specialties .045*
Professional -.045*
Technical/Sales -.040*
Service .003
Agricultural .030
Mechanic/Craftsman -.010
Operator, Laborer, Transportation Worker .009
Other .057**
Income -.067**
Note. *p < .05 and **p < .01, two-tailed.
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF HIERARCHICAL LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR
FOREPERSON AND DEFENDANT RACE VARIABLES PREDICTING JUROR
FINAL VERDICT VOTING PREFERENCE (n = 954)
Variable B SE B P
Step 1
Pre-deliberation Verdict Vote Preference .231 .014 .503*
Step 2
Pre-deliberation Verdict Vote Preference .233 .013 .506*
Foreperson and Defendant: Both Black .026 .073 .011
Foreperson and Defendant: Both White -.305 .093 -.102*
Foreperson and Defendant: Both Hispanic -.090 .124 -.022
Note. R2 = .253 for Step 1 \AR2 = .009 for Step 2 ( p s <  .05).
*p < .05, two-tailed.
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF HIERARCHICAL LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR JUROR
AND DEFENDANT RACE VARIABLES PREDICTING JUROR FINAL VERDICT
VOTING PREFERENCE (n = 954)
Variable B SE B p
Step 1
Pre-deliberation Verdict Vote Preference .234 .018 .493*
Step 2
Pre-deliberation Verdict Vote Preference .234 .018 .493*
Juror and Defendant: Both Black .004 .092 .020
Juror and Defendant: Both White -.470 .175 -.102*
Juror and Defendant: Both Hispanic -.190 .149 -.048
Note. R2 = .243 for Step 1; AR2 = .013 for Step 2 ( p s <  .05).
*p < .05, two-tailed.
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TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF HIERARCHICAL LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR 
FOREPERSON AND DEFENDANT RACE VARIABLES PREDICTING JUROR 
FINAL VERDICT VOTING PREFERENCE WITH NO JUROR AND DEFENDANT
RACIAL SIMILARITY (n = 609)
Variable B SE B fi
Step 1
Pre-deliberation Verdict Vote Preference .227 .023 .520*
Step 2
Pre-deliberation Verdict Vote Preference .225 .023 .515*
Foreperson and Defendant: Both Black -.017 .127 -.008
Foreperson and Defendant: Both White -.258 .124 -.117*
Foreperson and Defendant: Both Hispanic -.142 .227 .034
Note. R2 = .270 for Step 1 ;AR2 = .016 for Step 2 ( p s <  .05).
*p < .05, two-tailed.
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TABLE 5
SUMMARY OF HIERARCHICAL LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR
FOREPERSON, DEFENDANT, AND JUROR RACE SIMILARITY VARIABLES
PREDICTING JUROR FINAL VERDICT VOTING PREFERENCE (n = 954)
Variable B SEB f i
Step 1
Pre-deliberation Verdict Vote Preference .231 .014 .503*
Step 2
Pre-deliberation Verdict Vote Preference .232 .014 .506*
Foreperson, Defendant, and Juror: Black .008 .048 .005
Foreperson, Defendant, and Juror: White -.161 .052 -.098*
Foreperson, Defendant, and Juror: Hispanic -.076 .085 -.028
Note. R2 = .253 for Step 1; AR2 = .010 for Step 2 (ps < .05).
*p < .05, two-tailed.
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TABLE 6
SUMMARY OF POST HOC HIERARCHICAL LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS
FOR FOREPERSON AND DEFENDANT RACE VARIABLES PREDICTING
RACIAL MINORITY JUROR FINAL VERDICT VOTING PREFERENCE (n = 427)
Variable B SE B f i
Step 1
Pre-deliberation Verdict Vote Preference .234 .021 .521*
Step 2
Pre-deliberation Verdict Vote Preference .233 .021 .519*
Foreperson and Defendant: Both Black -.003 .108 -.001
Foreperson and Defendant: Both White -.518 .179 -.137*
Foreperson and Defendant: Both Hispanic .007 .190 .002
Racial Minority Foreperson and White .143 .484 .014
Defendant
Note. R2 = .271 for Step 1; AR2 = .019 for Step 2 (ps < .05). 
*p < .05, two-tailed.
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TABLE 7
SUMMARY OF POST HOC HIERARCHICAL LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS
FOR JUROR AND DEFENDANT RACE VARIABLES PREDICTING JUROR FINAL
VERDICT VOTING PREFERENCE (n = 954)
Variable B SEB fi
Step 1
Pre-deliberation Verdict Vote Preference .231 .014 .503*
Step 2
Pre-deliberation Verdict Vote Preference .232 .014 .502*
Juror and Defendant: Both Black -.036 .098 -.013
Juror and Defendant: Both White -.302 .111 -.093*
Juror and Defendant: Both Hispanic
00r .168 -.030
White Juror and Racial Minority Defendant -.063 .074 -.033
Note. R2 = .253 for Step 1 \AR2 = .007 for Step 2 (ps < .05). 
*p < .05, two-tailed.
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APPENDIX A 
Case Data Survey
For each charge submitted to the jury, please describe the charge (e.g., first-degree 
murder, aggravated assault. felony auto theft) and any lesser included charges on 
which the jury was instructed. Then indicate the jury's decision for those charges {C -  
Conviction, A “ Acquittal, H = Hung Jury).
If it is more convenient for you to do so, you may attach cop ies of the jury’s  
completed verdict forms instead of completing the table below.
C ount* J
’ Count* f  [
| I «s»er Included Charge j 
f Lesser Included Charge J 
t" L e s s e f T T ; c i u T e T c F a r g e  \
Count t  1
1 leaser Included Charge f  
' le s s e r  Included Charge \ 
niesscTTiduTed Charge " j
> Count 3  i
, Lesser Inducted Charge [
- Li^&WTncfiideQ C h a r g e ~{~
Lesser Included Charge
CounM -  *___ ’ _j
Lesser lncfuded Charge 
T e is e r  Inchfded Charge 
LtTssei Indtrdeci Change"
^ o u n t 5 "
LesserTnchrded Charge 
Lesser hrciifdeilCtiarge 
T esse r Inducted C harge
Count 6 __
LesseFTrrciritled Charge 
LesTeTTncliidedCiiafge 
T iiierT nduded  Charge
Based on the jury's decision on ail counts, what is the recommended sentence or range 
of sentences according to state sentencing guidelines, if any?
q Less than 1 year imprisonment o Mot Applicable / Mo convictions
o  1 to 5 years imprisonment 
o  5 to 10 years imprisonment 
o  10 to 20 years imprisonment 
o  20 or more years imprisonment 
o  Life imprisonment
Description Jury Decision
r  a  f h
38
V . I
'77W
Case Data Survey r_Mj
If mutUple defendants are being tried together, or testim ony or ovidenco about 
multiple victims is presented mt trial, p lease com plete the Supplemental 
Defendant and Victim Characteristics on pages 4 and 5 of this survey.
Defendant Characteristics 
Number of I j
defendants I J__
Defendant 1
Gander: o  Male o  Female
Race/Ethnicity
o  While - not Hispanic 
O White ~ Hispanic 
O Black - no! Hispanic 
O  Black - Hispanic
o  Asian
O Other (please specify);
Defendant Legal Representation
O  Private
O Court appointed - private 
O  Court appointed - Public Defender 
O Pro sc/pro per
Victim Characteristics
Number 
of victims 
Victim 1
Gender: O Male o  Female
Race/Ethnicity
O White - not Hispanic 
o  Wh ite - Hispanic 
O Black - not Hispanic 
O Black - Hispanic
o  Asian.
O Other (please specify);_______
Victim Relationship to Defendant
O Spouse / Domestic pai tner 
O Other family 
O  Employee/employer 
O  Other acquaintance 
ONone :
O  Unknown
VOIR DIRE (Jury Selection)
How large was the panel from which the Jury was selected? (Number of people)
Length of voir dire process? hours
Who conducted the voir dire?
O Questioning by judge with little or no participation by lawyers 
O Questioning by judge with questions submitted by lawyers 
O Questioning by judge and lawyers
O Questioning by lawyers with little or no participation by judge
Was a jury questionnaire used for conducting voir dire in this case? o  Yes o  No
If yes, please provide a copy of the jury questionnaire. r
Number of prospective jurors struck for cause or by stipulation? j„
Number of prospective jurors the prosecution struck using peremptory challenges?
Number of prospective jurors the defendant struck using peremptory challenges? 
Were Baisatt objections raised during voir dire? o  Yes o  No 
Was this an anonymous jury? oY es oN o
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■  w nh*T. 1 Case Data Survey 
TRIAL EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURES
/SB c
CTTrial Length 
Prosecution Evidence
# of Witnesses
(mdudifKj exports)
# of Expert witnesses
# of Exhibits ! ,
Days
Defense Evidence
D m# of Witnesses(rndndingi experts)# of Expert witnesses
# of Exhibits
r
n
What procedures were employed at trial? (please check all that apply)
O Juror notetaking permitted 
o  Juror notebooks provided
O Written copies of jury instructions provided to jurors
O Juror permitted to submit questions to witnesses (please attach copies of questions)
If jurors were permitted to submit questions to witnesses, 
how many did the jury submit during the trial?
How many were answered? OJ
Jury instructions given (please check all that apply)
O Before evidentiary phase of trial o After closing arguments
O Before closing arguments o Other (please specify)
During the trial, did the jury become aware of the defendant’s  criminal history (if any)?
O  Yes o  No o Not applicable (no known arrests/convictions)
During trial, did the jury become aware of sentencing possibilities if the defendant was convicted'
O Yes o  No
Was this case a retrial from a previous trial in which the jury deadlocked?
O Yes o  No
JURY DELIBERATIONS
Deliberation Length hours.CD minutes # of Deliberating Jurorsm
How was the jury foreperson/p residing juror selected?
o  Appointed by trial judge 
O  Randomly selected by trial judge 
o  Appointed/elected by jurors
O Other selection process (please specify):....   ^ ... ........... ......
Was the jury given any guidance about how to conduct its deliberations (e.g., selection of 
presiding juror, timing of first vote)? Q Yes o  No
Was the jury sequestered overnight during deliberations? o  Yes q No 
How many questions did the jury submit during deliberations? [ ]
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2??m
How many questions were answered?
Case Data Survey
m
Pleas© answer the following questions if the jury indicated during 
the deliberations that it was having difficulty reaching a verdict.
How many times, if any, did the jury indicate that 
it was having difficulty reaching a verdict?
How many times, if any, did the trial judge send the jury I I 1
back to deliberations to try to resolve the difficulty? [ , i ,  j
What assistance, if any, was provided to the jury to resolve the difficulty?
O  No assistance g iv e n
O Allcn-lypo charge read to jury (please attach the instructions used)
O  Additional jury instructions provided 
O Case reopened for additional evidence 
O  Case reopened for additional argument by counsel 
O  Other assistance (please specify)___________ ____
SUPPLEMENTAL DEFENDANT AND VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS 
For each additional defendant tried, please indicate the following;
Defendant 2
Gender: oMalc o  Female
Race/Ethnicity 
O  While - not I lispanic 
O While - Hispanic 
O  Black - not Hispanic 
O Blade - Hispanic 
O  Asian
O Other {please specify):
Legal Representation 
O Private
O Court appointed - private 
o  Court appointed - Pub Def 
O Pro se
Defendant 3
Gender: o  Male o  Female
Race/Ethnicity
o  White - not Hispanic 
O White - f lispanic 
O Black - not Hispanic 
O Blade - Hispanic 
O Asian
O Other (please specify);
Legal Representation
O Private
O Court appointed - private 
O Court appointed - Pub Def 
O Pro so
Defendant 4
Gender: o  Male o  Female
Race/Ethnicity 
O White - not Hispanic 
O White - Hispanic 
O Bfaek - not Hispanic 
O  Black - \ fispanic 
O  Asian
O Other (please specify):
Legal Representation 
O  Private
O  Court appointed - private 
O Court appointed - Pub Def 
O  Pro sc
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Mil?/mh Case Data Survey
For oach additional victim that testified or about whom 
evidence was admitted, please indicate the following:
Victim 2 
Gender o  Mate o  Female
Victim 3 
Gender o  Male o  Female
Victim 4 
Gender o  Mate oFomale
Race/Ethnicity
O White ~ not Hispanic 
O White - Hispanic 
O  Black - nol Hispanic 
O Black - Hispanic 
O  Asian
O Other (please specify):
Relationship to Defendant 
O Spouse / Domestic partner 
O Other family 
O Employee/employer 
o  Other acquaintance 
O  None 
O Unknown
Race/Ethnicity
O White - not Hispanic 
O White - Hispanic 
O Black - not Hispanic 
O  Black - Hispanic .
o  Asian
O Other (please specify):
Relationship to Defendant I
O  Spouse I Domestic partner ( 
O  Other family
O  Employce7employer j
O Other acquaintance |
O None ,
O  Unknown i
Race/Ethnicity 
o  White - not Hispanic 
O White - Hispanic 
O Black - not Hispanic 
O  Black - Hispanic 
O Asian
O  Other ( p l e a s e  specify}:
Relationship to Defendant 
O Spouse / Domestic partner 
O Other family 
O  Employee/employer 
O Other acquaintance 
O  None 
O  Unknown
Please make copies of this page or the proceeding one (if
necessary) to describe additional defendants or victims.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY.
APPENDIX B
Juror Q uestionnaire
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary* Your responses will be kept strictly
confidential. Flense record your answers on the attached answer sheet
General Questions about the 'Trial
1. Do you agree or disagree- that die attorneys presented all the relevant evidence in this
2. How complex was this trial?
3. Overall, how easy or difficult was it for your jury to understand the evidence in this, trial?
4. How easy or difficult was it for your jury to understand the expert testimony in this Case?
5. How easy or difficult was it lor thejury to understand the judge's instructions about the 
law in this case?
6. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Some of the other jurors did not 
understand key evidence in this case."
7. How important was police testimony to the prosecution's case?
8. How believable was the police testimony in this case?
9. In some criminal cases, the victims of the crime testify. How believable was the 
testimony o f the vietimfs) in this case?
10. In some criminal eases, the tkferKkmt testifies. How believable was die testimony of the 
defendants) in this case?
11. Overall. how much sympathy did you feet for the defendants) in this case?
12. ( Jveralt, how much sympathy did yew fed for the victimfs) in this case?
13. How -drillful was (were) the prosccutorfs) during the trial?
14. How ski II hi I was (were) the defense aUomey(s) during Ihe trial?
15. Overall, how satisfied were you with the maimer in which the trial was conducted?
16. f low strong was the prosecution’s case?
17. How strong was the defense’s case?
18. All things considered, how close was Lhis case?
Your Opinions about fite Case.
19. Thinking b a ck  over the trial and jury deliberations, when would you say 
that you started leaning toward one side or the other in this case? (please 
check one box only)
20. Did you find yourself changing your mind about the direction you were 
leaning during any of the following stages o f Ihe trisd? (check all that 
apply)
21. Before you began deliberating with your follow jurors at the end of the 
trial (after all o f the evidence and the judge’s instructions bad been 
presented),, which side did you favor?
22. How easy or difficult was it for you personally to decide what the verdict 
should he its rids case?
23. Do you agree or disagree with the following, statement: “Because o f my 
religious beliefs* 1 found it difficult to judge another person.”
YtHir Jury Deliberations.
The next set of questions asks about your experiences during the jury 
deliberations that took place at the end of the trial, after all the evidence and 
the judge's instructions were presented.
24. When was the jury's first vote?
25. Wits the first vote a secret ballot?
26. On the jury's first vote, how did you vote on the most serious charge?
27. How certain were you in your first vote?
28. On the jury's first vote on the most serious charge, how many jurors voted 
guilty, not guilty, or were undecided?
29. On the jury's final vote, how did you vote on the most serious charge?
30. On the jury’s final vote on the most serious charge, how many jurors voted 
gutliy, not guilty, or were undecided?
3 1. When deliberations began at the end o f the trial, how surprised were you 
personally at the verdict preferences expressed by the other members o f 
the jury?
32. How open-minded were the members of the jury to the ideas of other 
jumrs?
33.3 low much did you participate in thejury deliberations?
34. How influential were you in thejury deliberations?
35.1 low much would you say that one or two jurors dominated the 
deliberations?
36. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “"Ihere were some 
very unreasonable people on this jury.”
37. How much trouble did thejury have recalling the trial evidence during the 
jury deliberations?
38. How much trouble did the jury have recalling the judge’s instructions on 
the law during die jury deliberations?
39. How thoroughly was each juror’s point of view considered in the jury's 
deliberations?
40. How personally close and friendly would you suy thejury was?
41.1 low much conflict was there on thejury?
42. Do you feel that yon lutd enough time to express your views during jury 
deliberations?
43. How much time and effort did juror* spend trying to convince people to 
agree?
44. Mow easy or difficult was it fur the jury to reach a decision?
45. How satisfied were you with the jury's deliberations?
46. How satisfied were you with the jury's decision {guilty, not guilty, hungj?
47. How fair do you think die law was in ill is ease?
48. To what extent were you worried about the consequences to the defendant 
of a conviction by this jury?
49. In some trials, a strict application o f the law might not seem to produce the 
fairest possible outcome. In tins trial, how fair would you say the legally 
correct outcome was?
50. In some trials, the consequences of a conviction might seem cither too 
harah or too lenient. Eor the particular ease and defendant. I low lenient or 
harsh do you think the consequences o f a conviction were likely to be in 
this case?
51. If it were entirely up to you as a one-person jury, what would your verdict 
have been in this case?
52. How much trust and confidence do you have in the police in your 
community?
53. How' much trust and confidence do you have in die courts in your 
community?
54. To what extent do you believe that crime is a serious problem in your
-community?..
Our final set of questions asks about you aud your household, and will help us analyze the 
information you and other jurors have given us. Again, al! of this information is 
completely confidential and will only be used to help us study and improve the jury system.
55. Wen? you the jury foreman or presiding juroi?
56. Have you ever served as a juror before this trial?
57. If yes, was your jury service in a civil or criminal ease?
51i. Cieuideri;
59. Age:
60. How many years o f  school have you completed?
6 1. Race/Ethnicity:
62. How would you describe your religious beliefs?
63. What was your total household income last year?
64. Job status:
65. If you are fweseatty employed, please select the occupational category 
below that best fits your occupation:
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP WITH THIS 
IMPORTANT PROJECT!
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